Kairotech Holdings, Inc.

Buyers qualify the product. DIVA helps source, vet, score, and match it to demand. AMs close the deal with retailers. Current company-wide close rate is roughly 30%. Working hypothesis: nearly all lost opportunities trace back to buying — price, not selling execution. Roughly 99% of items that don't sell after entering DIVA are believed to be a price issue, not a demand issue. The quality of what enters the pipeline determines the quality of everything downstream.

The goal is to increase the number of good opportunities, not just the count — we do not want reps logging near-certain deals just to inflate the funnel.

• Adele leads day-to-day tracking of the opportunity pipeline (from AM interest through close or died), working alongside the formal daily pipeline report Matthew's team already runs.
• Matthew retains full manager oversight of his team's deals — coaching and forecasting stay his.
• Jerry retains visibility, since buying decisions are the primary driver of whether an opportunity is winnable in the first place.

1. Grow every AM toward $1M AGP. Baby steps. Matt and Zac are there. The other six need a path. Matt runs the team day-to-day; Adele develops the people and the strategy.
2. Customer portals. Give customers self-service access to product, pricing, and order status through DIVA.
3. Concentration risk. Top 2 buyers represent 57.8% of GP. Diversification is survival. Immediate priority.
4. Dormant account reactivation. 1,406 inactive accounts. Even moving utilization from 7.1% to 12% represents significant AGP growth.

1. Gene's $598K AGP in 4 months = $1.8M annualized pace. That's $1.8M in AGP walking out the door. The transition plan isn't optional — it's a margin emergency.
2. Ryan is stepping up. $586K AGP in 4 months, pacing toward $1.8M annualized — nearly matching Gene. But 36 deals across 4 months means he's already running hot before absorbing 20 Gene accounts.
3. Brandon and Meg are the margin story. Both at 35.5% GP. Brandon's AGP is growing. Meg is building from zero with strong margins — exactly the profile for absorbing smaller Gene vendors.
4. Carlos's GP% dropped from 36.5% (FY25) to 27.4% (2026 YTD). Worth investigating — is he taking lower-margin deals for volume, or is product quality shifting? Jerry to have direct conversation with Carlos — he will respond positively to the data.
5. Harry does fewer, bigger deals. 11 deals producing $166K AGP. Different operating model — depth over breadth.

1. Feed DIVA constantly. The marketplace is only as good as the product flowing into it. Buyers must find, qualify, and push quality vendor product into the DIVA pipeline. Jerry manages this directly.
2. Perfect the buying process. If garbage enters DIVA, garbage reaches AMs. The funnel between vendor offer and DIVA must produce clean, structured, qualified product data. Jerry and Chris own this together.
3. Understand buyer bandwidth. The ~15-account ceiling from AM data doesn't apply to buyers. With DIVA automation, buyer capacity could be 30–50+ vendor relationships. Run the analysis — deals per vendor, GP per vendor, quality dropoff by vendor count — to find the real number.
4. Transition Gene's 150 accounts. Match each vendor to the right buyer by product type, personality, and capacity. AI analysis to tier vendors: high-touch, automation-ready, or at-risk.
5. Inform the January decision. The pilot determines what kind of VP Purchasing hire UNCS actually needs. Three shapes are on the table: (a) traditional buying VP, (b) dedicated opportunity manager, (c) BI/BA hybrid. Chris's listen-and-learn with every buyer informs what the role needs and what DIVA can automate.

Every customer that joins DIVA adds more vendor data to the marketplace. More data makes the scoring better for everyone. Better scoring attracts more customers. Heartland's vendor offers that don't fit Heartland might be perfect for UNCS — and vice versa. The marketplace gets smarter with every customer, and every customer benefits from the collective intelligence.

1. Listen first, then build. 15 days sitting with every AM and buyer to understand how they actually use the tools. Initial listening sessions may already be underway. Champion program: one power user per department for continuous feedback.
2. Per-customer scoring. A deal scoring 60 for UNCS might score 30 for Heartland — and vice versa. Each customer gets scores calibrated to their own history, categories, and margins.
3. Buyer workflow automation (buy-side, with Jerry). Perfect the sourcing funnel — how buyers qualify product, manage vendor submissions, and feed clean data into DIVA. Primary focus during the pilot.
4. Customer portals (sell-side, with Adele). Give Matt's AMs a tool to share with their customers — curated product views, pricing, order tracking. Second priority.
5. Vendor portals. Give Jerry's buying team a tool to manage vendor submissions — qualification status, compliance tracking, product data entry.
6. Onboard Heartland. Prove the external customer model works. Heartland feeds their data in, gets their own DIVA scores out, makes better buying decisions.

Gene generated $1.54M AGP in FY2025 (150 deals, 18.4% of total buyer AGP) and is pacing at $1.8M AGP annualized in 2026. Adele briefed Brett on the status of Gene's ~150 vendor accounts — sorted by AGP over five years, cleaned for duplicates, and categorized by product type and vendor personality. Gene's own notes on each vendor were included. The proposed allocation (Section 5) was discussed but not finalized.

Jerry manages the buying team directly as Interim Director of Purchasing. Adele focuses on account development, sales growth, and opportunity pipeline tracking as CDO. Matt runs the sales team day-to-day as EVP Sales. Chris builds DIVA — buy-side with Jerry (primary), sell-side with Adele (secondary). Reporting lines are unchanged: Jerry and Adele both report to Brett as CEO.

This is a reallocation of time and focus, not a change in authority or org structure. The purpose is to test how buying/DIVA/selling actually splits in practice, so the permanent VP Purchasing hire (targeted January 2027) is based on real evidence rather than a guess.

The pilot is designed to reveal what kind of purchasing hire is actually needed once Gene's replacement is defined. Three shapes are on the table:

1. Traditional buying VP — runs the buying team directly, sourcing judgment as the core skill
2. Dedicated opportunity manager — BI/BA-leaning, owns pipeline hygiene between buying and selling
3. BI/BA hybrid — some blend of the two, depending on how much of buying ends up automated through DIVA

Which of these makes sense depends on what the pilot actually shows — particularly whether Matthew's existing daily pipeline report and Adele's added tracking complement each other or start to duplicate effort.

Jerry has direct visibility into buying quality — the primary driver of opportunity quality. Adele's time shifts from managing two teams to developing accounts and tracking the pipeline. Matt keeps full control of his team without competing for pipeline ownership. Chris builds the technology with clear counterparts: Jerry for buy-side, Adele for sell-side. The seams are explicit, and the pilot will show where they hold and where they don't.

The pilot is set. Jerry runs buying. Adele develops accounts and tracks the pipeline. Matt runs sales. Chris builds DIVA. The five dysfunctions framework now applies to execution: honor the lanes (trust), make decisions in the room (conflict), track weekly + bimonthly DIVA overview (commitment), use the scorecards (accountability), distribute revenue concentration (results). The data exists. The structure exists. Run the pilot through December, then make the permanent hire based on what you learned — not a guess.